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Einstein’s (1916) first survey of General Relativity is deeply flawed 
in its informal introductory section, Part A. He presents the salient 
feature of the new theory as the mere lifting of coordinate 
restrictions on Special Relativity rather than its being a spacetime 
theory of gravity. Minkowski (1908) developed a different 
conception of Special Relativity, independent of light and 
signalling, with spacetime as its immediate and principal 
consequence. If Einstein had begun general relativity from that 
basis he would have avoided the many errors into which Part A 
fell. 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Einstein (1916) was the first complete survey paper on General Relativity (GR), 
arguably the most powerful and elegant theory in the history of science, cosmic in 
scope, new and surprising in its array of concepts, unprecedented in its style of 
explanation. The paper divides into five Parts. Part A, ‘Fundamental 
Considerations on the Postulate of Relativity’, stands to the full theory rather as 
Newton’s Scholium stands to the full theory in Principia (Newton 1999). Each 
expresses what its author saw as the broad meaning of its prime concepts, space and 
time. Like the Scholium, Part A is of great metaphysical interest. Its immediate 
influence on philosophical thought as well as thought in physics was very strong and 
very misleading.  
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A main aim of this paper is to show that, while Einstein’s contributions to science 
were second to none, he wrote Part A under the spell of a dogmatic empiricist 
epistemology. It is a cautionary tale: the very brightest among us can be widely 
misled by bad philosophical convictions. 
 
2 PART A: General remarks 
  
In Part A, and especially in §§1-3, Einstein argued for a conclusion essential to 
GR: the postulate of relativity of motion must extend beyond its restricted scope in 
Special Relativity (SR): the theory must be formulated in generally covariant style. 
Einstein took this to show that the theory dispenses with space and time and 
requires focus just on material point-coincidences.  
A glance at the end of §3 and the topic of general covariance suggests which way 
Einstein thought the new wind should blow through §§1-3. §3 concludes: 
 
… this requirement of general covariance1… takes away from space and time the last 
remnant of physical objectivity [117]. (My emphasis).  
 
That is plausibly the metaphysical goal of these three sections. 
A fatal flaw pervades Part A §§1-3. The only reason why the “postulate of the 
special principle of relativity” must be extended is simple: the curvature of 
spacetime is the heart and soul of GR’s theory of gravity. If it is curved in any 
model, then, obviously, appropriately curved coordinates are needed to cover it in 
that model. SR’s special linear coordinates can’t do that job. GR’s theory of gravity 
may not be simple but the move from curved spacetime to curved coordinates is. 
Since the spacetimes of the theory vary both from model to model and, in any 
model, may vary from place to place, the range of smooth curvilinear coordinates is 
virtually unconfined. You may use curvilinears in any Riemannian space or 
spacetime. In variably curved spacetimes you must use them. 
In these opening sections, Einstein never mentioned the curvature of spacetime: 
it is nowhere cited as demanding the extension of coordinate systems to the general 
                                                
1 For an informal account of general covariance concerned just with specifying the metric of a 
spacetime, see consecutively numbered paragraphs in §5 below. 
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group. He argued throughout from examples i.e. thought experiments. Each one 
introduces massive objects but at so great a distance as to allow a setting in 
effectively zero gravity, i.e. in an arbitrarily extended inertial frame of reference; i.e. 
in flat spacetime. For instance “Let K be a Galilean system of reference, i.e. a 
system relative to which … a mass sufficiently distant from other masses, is moving 
with uniform motion in a straight line.” (114)2. Thus Einstein pictures GR as if it 
were SR, save for permitting a wider range of rest bodies or systems, but without 
the addition of any new gravitational physics. But in such settings there is no need for 
lifting SR restrictions. Every example consistent with the use of Galilean inertial 
frames and flat spacetime can be adequately, indeed best, described and analysed in 
Lorentz coordinates. They are privileged in SR. Einstein concluded that they can’t 
cope with his examples and that no frames are privileged for them. Both 
conclusions are false.  
He saw GR as an expanded relativity theory, not an advance in understanding 
gravity.  
Why did this pervasive error occur?3 
 
3 Part A §1: Observations on the Special Theory of Relativity 
 
Einstein’s 2-postulate version of SR 
 
 The section begins by asserting that there are two postulates for SR: The first 
postulate, the special principle of relative motion (that motion is a symmetrical 
relation among inertial frames of reference), is satisfied in both classical mechanics 
and SR (the 1905 theory of physics that respects the principle). In the second 
paragraph Einstein claims that “the special theory of relativity does not depart from 
classical mechanics through the postulate of relativity but through the postulate of 
the constancy of the velocity of light in vacuo, from which, in combination with the 
special theory of relativity, there follow…the relativity of simultaneity, the 
Lorentzian transformation, and the related laws for the behaviour of moving bodies 
and clocks” (111). 
                                                
2 Numbers in brackets are page numbers in Einstein (1916). 
3 I assume that Part A was written in the light of succeeding Parts. 
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The quoted claim was first shown to be false in §1 of Minkowski’s famous paper 
(1908) and in his (1915). The light postulate and operations based on it are not 
needed to gain the results listed above. Two years later than Minkowski, Ignatowski 
(1910) also deduced the same results just from the special principle of relativity 
alone. Einstein may have overlooked Ignatowski’s paper but we can hardly suppose 
him ignorant of the claims and arguments advanced by Minkowski. However it 
may have happened, it is clear that, in Part A, Einstein ignored both spacetime itself 
and Minkowski’s novel and elegant way of arriving at it. Since this aspect of 
Minkowski’s work is, astonishingly, almost totally absent from later literature it 
seems likely that most students of Einstein (1916) have followed him in ignoring it. 
Minkowki himself made it a prominent part of his “well-known” paper.  
 
Minkowski’s absolutist version of SR. 
 
Roughly, Einstein developed SR as a theory of physics; Minkowski drew it more 
from mathematical invention.  
Minkowski set out “from the accepted mechanics of the present day, along a 
purely mathematical line of thought, to arrive at changed ideas of space and time”. 
The ideas “have sprung from the soil of experimental physics and therein lies its 
strength.” ((1908):75). 
In his (1905) Einstein saw that the contemporary neo-Newtonian, Galilean 
relativity of motion, conjoined with an absolute constant speed for light, foisted 
bizarre results on electromagnetism. He also saw that the problem lay in time’s 
invariance under the Galilean recipe for change of inertial frame. His solution 
exploited the invariance of light speed under change of inertial frame, together with 
new operations for synchronising clocks by light signalling and so on. Minkowski 
saw the problem and its solution as deeper and more general. Its foundation lay in 
the geometry of the relation of time to space, not in any particular theory or its 
operations in physics – e.g. electromagnetism. His motivation in §1 of the 
revolutionary paper (1908) was that the standard picture of time’s relation to space 
had bizarre features just because it completely separates them. His motivating 
remarks are terse and scattered and not crucial to his argument. His distinct and 
more general critique of classical relativity has no overlap with Einstein’s. 
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Briefly, Minkowski invented a metric for a newly conceived unification of space 
and time that took its departure from the Euclidean spatial metric in Cartesian 
coordinates. The most obvious (and conservative) approach to this assumes that 
pseudo-Cartesians would coordinate the new 4 dimensional manifold. That entails 
that the inclusion of dt2 makes the time coordinate pseudo-orthogonal to the spatial 
ones. The important difference between time and space is preserved if spatial and 
temporal differentials have opposite signs in the metric equation. Further, the 
equation makes sense only when spatial and temporal units are linked, so a 
constant, c, tying units of time to spatial ones, becomes a coefficient of the time 
differential dt (or else of each of the three spatial ones). Then c has some such form 
as metres-per-second or seconds-per-metre or light-years-per-year. It is a speed. 
This “purely mathematical line of thought” yields the now familiar form of the 
Lorentz metric: 
 
ds2 = c2dt2 – dx2 - dy2 – dz2 
 
The value of c is remains undetermined although its role is clear. It is not 
intelligible that it be an infinite speed (1908: 79). Experience suggests that it is very 
large but measurement is needed to discover it. One need not measure light speed: 
measurements confirming the addition theorem for velocities will do. It is then a 
contingent, but epistemologically a highly convenient fact that something – light in 
vacuo – has that speed. But the metric is independent of that: SR would not collapse 
if light turned out not to travel at c - if the photon is massive for example. In the 
pseudo-geometry thus invented the metric is assumed to be the same at each point 
of the new manifold just as is assumed for Euclidean space. Thus c takes its place as 
defining a finite, constant, invariant speed. 4 
Minkowski believed that mathematicians should have reached SR along this line 
of thought before the physicists did. The thoughts are mainly mathematical.5 He 
                                                
4 For a more detailed account of Minkowski §1 see Nerlich (2013) Ch 3, Cacciatori et. al (2008, 
Petkov (forthcoming) esp Chapter 8.2. For Ignatowski see Brown (2005) Lange (2013). Cox and 
Foreshaw (2009): 74-88 reach a “no light” version somewhat differently. Mermin (1984) and Sen 
(1994) are “no light” papers representative of a series of papers Am. Jnl of Physics. 
5 Mathematicians missed the triumphant possibility of arriving first at SR and along a simpler, 
clearer route.This opinion has distinguished support. See Pauli (1958): 11, who mentions Ignatowski, 
but, surprisingly, not Minkowski; also Dyson (1972): 640-643 and Cacciotori et al. (2008).  
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called his method of invention “fancy free” (op. cit.: 79). Of course one needs to 
look and see whether the world is as the theory says. 
It is surprising and regrettable that this part of his lecture is so seldom 
mentioned.  It builds SR on a quite different basis from the more familiar one.  
The 2-postulate version of SR held a tenacious grip on Einstein’s imagination. 
His justified, strong satisfaction with its empiricist, operationalist, methods probably 
obscured the advantages of Minkowski’s deeper, more immediate perspective on 
changed ideas of space and time. One advantage of this perspective is that it puts 
spacetime at the foundation of the new theory from the start. The basis is no longer 
a form of relativity but “the postulate of the absolute world” (1908: 83). It points 
toward a version of GR that also postulates an absolute world and not a relativity 
theory. 
Here’s a bare bones sketch of how Einstein might have proceeded.6 The classical 
first law describes the trajectories of force-free motion. They project up into straight 
trajectories of Minkowski spacetime – its geodesics. The “happiest thought of 
[Einstein’s] life”7 - that to fall freely in a gravitational field is to feel no force - 
suggests that all purely gravitational trajectories could be the force-free geodesics of 
a new curved spacetime. He needed to find a law that linked the distribution of 
mass-energy with the right geometry. That, together with the equivalence of inertial 
and gravitational mass, gives a reasonably articulate skeleton of GR and how it 
reduces gravity as a force to the geometric structure of spacetime. Einstein tells us 
that he was in command of much of this as early as 1908. Seven years were spent in 
search of a generally covariant formulation of GR. That preoccupation, together 
with his imperfect grasp of the output of that struggle, may explain why the 
thoughts of 1908 had become less salient by 1916. 
Led by his choice of a light postulate and starring inertial frames of reference, 
clocks, rods and signalling as the principal foundations of the theory, Einstein writes 
                                                                                                                                   
In this connection Max Born’s (1975:131)5 cites a letter from Minkowski in which the latter states 
that Einstein’s 1905 came as a great shock to him since he had already reached his own spacetime 
account of SR before that paper appeared. This does not establish priority and Minkowski never 
claimed it. It does establish independence. Probably the ‘fancy free’ mathematician whom 
Minkowski appears merely to imagine (Minkowski 1908: 78-9.) is in fact his earlier self. Born (op. 
cit.: 98) mentions an advanced seminar at Göttingen in 1905 given by Hilbert and Minkowski on 
electromagnetism. Minkowski was working in the area at the time. 
6 For another see Misner et al. (1973): 1-10. 
7 Schilpp (1949): 67, Pais (1982) Part IV §9. 
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that “the laws of geometry…are to be interpreted directly as laws relating to the 
possible relative positions of solid bodies at rest…and as laws which describe the 
relations of measuring bodies and clocks” (112). This fits with his pursuit of 
stationary systems throughout his examples and the relationalist, operationalist, 
empiricist tenor of the whole Part. But one does not now need to be Einstein to see 
that all this sets off in quite the wrong direction. 
 
4 Part A §2: The need for an Extension of the Postulate of 
Relativity  
 
§2 of Part A aims to establish a need to extend the postulate of relativity beyond the 
set of inertial frames privileged in both classical mechanics and SR. So it takes on 
the style of a metaphysical, epistemological relativity theory - a thought that springs 
quite naturally from the operationalist 2-postulate version.  
Einstein’s strong empiricism is evident throughout. As an empiricist metaphysical 
theory, the relativity of motion, in one or another form, implies two immediately 
relevant theses. The first is restrictive: statements about motion are intelligible if and 
only if the motion of an observable thing is referred to an observable object taken as 
at rest. The second is permissive: any observable object may be taken as at rest. The 
theses are epistemologically driven. Classical and SR physics reject them both, so, 
in one plain sense, their conjunction was a priori, with no support from physics 
before 1916. In GR, the holy grail of general covariance doesn’t really contain what 
the permissive thesis claims: that any object can be taken at rest. It permits a free 
choice among coordinates that are consistent with the geometric structure of any 
model. That does include, for any particle, coordinates that describe it as at rest i.e. 
its x, y, z coordinates are constant. But that is not the main sense of general 
covariance: there is no requirement on a coordinate system that some object be at 
rest in it. Einstein does not spell out either metaphysical thesis yet it was clearly his 
ardent wish, and his eventual belief, that GR should incorporate them. Unlike 
Einsteinian SR, GR is not a theory about which frames of reference may be taken 
as at rest. 
 
Absolute Rotation 
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Einstein’s approach to his first target – the need to extend the SR range of 
coordinates in GR – begins at a tangent. He argues for the rejection of absolute 
rotation. He does not directly consider Newton’s elegant thought experiment (in the 
Scholium). Let there be a world containing nothing but a system of two massive 
balls, joined by a cord, the balls rotating round the centre of the cord in a plane 
containing it and the centres of the balls. A tension in the cord conserves angular 
momentum. The tension is observable, and, in classical and SR physics, it is 
decisive evidence of rotation. Since nothing exists but this system, rotation in 
absolute space causes the tension in the cord. (See Janssen (2002:)7-8). 
Einstein suggests a different thought experiment to oppose this view. It is 
confusing so I pursue Newton’s easier example. It makes a limpid claim to absolute 
acceleration.  
Einstein objects that Newton’s example “cannot be admitted as epistemologically 
satisfactory unless the reason given is an observable fact of experience”. Newton 
gives only a “factitious cause and not a thing that can be observed”. He regards this 
as “a weighty argument from the theory of knowledge”. “The cause must lie outside 
the system…the general laws of motion … must be such that the mechanical 
behaviour…is partly conditioned, in quite essential respects, by distant masses 
[which are] … the seat of the causes” of the tension in the cord (113).8 
Clearly Mach’s discussion of Newton’s bucket experiment was also in Einstein’ 
mind. 
However, Newton’s example, just as he gave it, is at home in both SR and in 
GR, which thus inherit any fault, epistemological or other, that the example may 
bring with it. The GR story is just the SR story in a model set in Minkowski 
spacetime with negligible perturbation from the small masses in the system – a 
situation Einstein always preferred in Part A. For SR, as well as for this GR model, 
the difference between Newton’s case and another where there is no rotation lies 
not only in the different states of the cord but also in the proper times along 
worldlines of (central particles within) the balls. Without rotation these worldlines 
                                                
8 This is confusing in that Einstein has already secured his inertial frame, as always, by putting 
distant masses so distant as to make gravitation negligible. But how is the behavior of the system 
conditioned by these masses? 
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are geodesics; with rotation they are spirals in spacetime. Thus there is a difference 
in proper-time magnitudes. This would be observable if the balls were replaced by 
massive clocks. (Dorling (1978)).  
Dorling (op. cit) and Janssen (2002) argue that this kinematical, proper-time, 
evidence means that the kinematical absolute rotation (in spacetime) is observable. 
This would clear the example of epistemological fault. I doubt that Einstein would 
have agreed. That still falls short of observing the cause i.e. the absolute rotation in 
spacetime, of the tension in the cord.9 The evidence for absolute rotation remains 
both decisive and indirect. A relative rotation can be seen directly, an absolute one 
can’t. Further, the shorter proper-times along the rotating balls’ worldlines are not 
the tension’s cause: their spiralling in spacetime is. That is an absolute rotation. GR 
fails to endorse the epistemological version of the relativity of motion. It does not 
forbid “factitious” causes any more than earlier theories did. No doubt much of the 
charm of the 2-postulate version lay in the hope that it would. 
There is a further question that need not be pursued here: does GR admit a 
satisfactory Machian account of the example? If the solution is required to conform 
to the epistemological version of the relativity of motion, the answer is no. 
Boundary conditions on the structure of spacetime at infinity are needed. That 
transgresses the demands of epistemological relativity (Janssen (2002: 19-22). 
So far, none of this is about coordinate systems. Einstein’s immediate proposal 
changes the physics of the case not its coordinates. GR’s field equation entails that 
the distant matter on which Einstein insisted will curve spacetime. That forbids 
Lorentz coordinates. Einstein nowhere pursues this theme, obvious though it is 
from absolutist SR taken with the theory of gravity in Part C. 
He writes instead that the distant observable masses “take over the role of the 
factitious cause R1 [i.e. absolute space]. Of all imaginable spaces, R1, R2 etc., in 
any kind of motion relative to one another, there is none we may look on as 
privileged a priori without reviving the above-mentioned epistemological objection. 
The laws of physics must be of such a nature that they apply to systems of reference in any kind of 
                                                
9 Human observers are continuant spatial beings living in time. Which spacetime structures can they 
observe? No good answer is obvious to me. If I toss a ball and catch it do I observe that its trajectory 
is (almost) a spacetime geodesic? I think not, but perhaps my conclusion in this paragraph is too 
quick. 
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motion. Along this road we arrive at an extension of the postulate of relativity”. (116; 
original italics).   
What is this reasoning? Presumably it envisages changing the reference (rest) 
frame (thus the space) to admit Mach’s striking suggestion: choose a space where 
the balls are at rest and the outside masses rotate round them. That certainly 
provides a strong “aha!” moment, but even granted the general laws by which the 
masses condition the system’s behaviour, there is nothing to suggest how the change 
of system of reference (coordinates) explains anything at all about causation. That 
may make calculations more intuitive but there is no way that it alters the GR 
physics. The argument is invalid. It gives no reason to extend the postulate of 
relativity.  
Further, neither Newton’s mechanics nor SR privilege any space a priori. Inertial 
frames are certainly privileged but for good empirical reasons: the laws of mechanics are 
invariant with respect to them. The road to that discovery from Aristotle to Galileo, 
Descartes and Newton was long, hesitant, replete with observations and 
experiments, false leads, failed theories and confusions. As long as Einstein’s 
examples are set in the context of SR then there are empirically privileged frames of 
reference, adequate within those theories to explain fully the tension in the cord 
without postulating outside matter. Such examples do not and cannot point to a 
need to expand the coordinate systems beyond the ones privileged in those 
empirical, a posteriori theories. 
 
Accelerated Frames in SR 
 
Einstein next turns to another familiar thought experiment: “…a well known 
physical fact…favours an extension of the theory of relativity” (114). Gravity 
accelerates objects equally whatever their mass and constitution. The example that 
explores this begins, as before, by setting large masses at large distances thus 
permitting an inertial reference frame in virtually empty spacetime. Suppose, then, 
an inertial frame F1 and an object, O, in uniform motion in it. Consider a second 
frame F2 in uniform acceleration relative to F1. Object O is now accelerated relative to 
F2 as a rest frame, independently of its mass or makeup.  Relative to F2, the second 
law of motion requires a field of force in which O and all other objects, fall. Only 
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the postulation of a uniform gravitational field can account for this phenomenon in 
this rest frame.  
Einstein’s main thesis is that postulating this field gives F2 an equal right with F1 
to be regarded as a rest system but one in which there is a uniform gravitational 
field. The frames “may both with equal right be looked on as “stationary”’ (114). So 
an extension of the Relativity Postulate is needed to include such frames. But the 
frames do not have an equal right to be taken as stationary in flat spacetime and no 
extension of coordinates is needed. 
Einstein concludes that GR must include a theory of gravitation, ‘since we are 
able to “produce” a gravitational field merely by changing the system of 
coordinates’. That is one aspect of the crucial link between gravity, acceleration and 
geometry. It does not include Einstein’s “happiest thought” - that fall under gravity 
is force-free. It gives no reason to extend coordinates. It does not link curvature to 
mass. 
F1 can be an inertial frame only if SR holds to a good approximation and 
spacetime is Minkowskian. There is no matter-sourced, real (“tidal-force”) 
gravitational field: it would be represented by spacetime’s curvature and thus be 
non-uniform. Any “gravity” springs wholly from the free choice of coordinates not 
from the structure of spacetime. 
In §2, Einstein provides no sound reason for extending the postulate of the 
special relativity of motion. Nevertheless that conclusion is needed. It comes quite 
intuitively through the absolute world version of SR together with later Parts of 
(1916). 
 
5 Part A §3 The Requirement of General Covariance 
 
Coordinates in space and spacetime 
 
§3 begins by noting that in classical mechanics and SR, coordinates have a direct 
physical meaning: a point on an x axis has the coordinate number n if it is n spatial 
units10 along the positive axis of the system. That is a ‘direct’ physical meaning. The 
                                                
10 A background standard of congruence is needed too.  
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same holds for numbers on the time coordinate axis. This directness must be 
abandoned in GR. The same point is made earlier in §1 (112). 
Why must it be abandoned? The first major job of coordinates is to provide for 
calculating the magnitude of any very small interval between two arbitrary but nearby 
points in a space or spacetime: i.e. the job of expressing the space’s metric structure 
in a small region. The job can’t really be done directly, even given the most 
amenable spatial structure. However, there is a simplest way. 
The exercise in the next five paragraphs is elementary. Surprisingly, it is just the 
elements that Part A distorts.  
To write a whole theory of physics in generally covariant style (with tensors) is a 
challenging enterprise but in Part A, Einstein is concerned with a much simpler task 
– merely writing a spacetime metric in that coordinate style. To see how to do this, 
consider the simplest case: Cartesian coordinates for 2-dimensional Euclidean 
space. 
1 The length of an arbitrary interval is calculated by first projecting each of its 
end-points orthogonally onto the x and y axes to find its x and y coordinates. Then 
one finds the x and the y coordinate differences between these coordinates numbers. 
In general the coordinate differences depend on the orientation of the axes relative 
to the line in space that joins the points That already goes a little beyond Einstein’s 
account of directness. The squared magnitude of the interval is given via 
Pythagoras’s Theorem from the sum of the squares of the coordinate differences 
(differentials) thus: 
 
ds2 = dx2 + dy2 
 
That is the simplest form of a calculation that completes the coordinate job for this 
space. Cartesians for Euclidean space are beautifully succinct because their square-
grid structure directly encodes both the parallels and the Pythagorean orthogonality 
structure throughout that space itself. Everywhere, the sides of any right-angled 
triangle bear the Pythagorean relation to the hypotenuse. Cartesians are objectively 
privileged. 
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Figure 1 
2 In Euclidean space, a simple departure from Cartesians is to use skew 
coordinates.  
 
 
Figure 2 
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The preceding simplest coordinate representation of the metrical relation between 
spatially separated points immediately fails. The metric calculation must now take 
account of the angle, a, between skew coordinate axes as a coefficient of the cross 
product of the differentials. 
 
ds2 = dx2 + 2cosa dx.dy + dy2 
 
The spatial distance itself between the points is unaffected. This takes a first easy 
step towards general coordinates. The metrics in skew and in general coordinates 
differ from the succinct Cartesian expression only in complexity. The space remains 
Euclidean. But their greater complexity hints at a deeper similarity in the structure 
of all metrics among all coordinates. An underlying general form for all Riemannian 
spaces is: 
 
ds.ds = g11dx1.dx1 +g12 dx1.dx2 + g21dx2.dx1 + g22dx2.dx2 
 
A metric is often referred to just as gik where i and k are index variables describing 
the n×n (for n dimensional space) array of coefficients. This is a massive 
abbreviation in characterising metrics. All Riemannian geometries (of 2 dimensions) 
have metrics in which the coordinate differences (differentials) are thus pairwise 
multiplied together in every way. Different coefficients (gik etc.) are attached to each 
product in the order indicated. A product vanishes if the coefficient is 0 and is 
unchanged, and omitted, if it is 1. General coordinates are freely chosen within that 
loose constraint. The equation is called the metric tensor. 
3 That free choice allows us to choose coordinate curves instead of straight 
lines and arbitrary angles of intersection of x with y coordinates. The 
correspondence between points in the space and coordinate number pairs (triples, 
quadruples etc. for higher dimensions) is required only to be 1-1, continuous and 
differentiable (smooth). Any direct relation between coordinate number differences 
and spatial length is abandoned. These coordinates are general. They form the 
largest group of coordinates that correspond 1-1 with ordered number pairs such 
that the topology – the continuous smooth relations between points or numbers – is 
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invariant. The transformation equations that take us from one of these general 
systems to another are smooth and continuous.  
 
 
Figure 3 
 
 
4 Cartesian coordinates encode a great deal of space’s structure just in the 
conventions by which we set them up. That is how the metric can be expressed so 
simply. In skew and in general coordinates this encoding is deliberately erased and 
the information replaced explicitly in the coefficients of the differential products. So 
what is contained in the metric equation is the same but conveyed by different 
means. 
5 Why do this? Cartesians are possible only in Euclidean space (Lorentzians 
only in Minkowski spacetime) where there are parallels and a Pythagorean 
structure. Their simplicity may be lost in two ways: first by arbitrarily choosing new 
coordinate styles, as we did, simply to show that the actual spatial magnitudes may 
be detached from the arbitrarily varied coordinate numbering conventionally 
chosen; or by being forced to adopt more complex coordinates by the structural properties 
of the space or spacetime itself. Spacetime has intrinsic curvature if and only if it has no 
parallels. If curved, the metric, in whatever possible coordinates, can’t be Cartesian 
(“direct” in Einstein’s usage). However, in Riemannian spaces, it still takes the basic 
quadratic form: the coefficients of the cross-product terms generally contain non-
zero and non-unit coefficients. (See e.g. Norton (1993), Rynasciewicz (1999)). 
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Armed with this sketch of basics let’s return to Einstein Part A §3. 
The Minowskian spacetime version of SR makes it obvious that a generally 
covariant style of coordinates, even in flat spaces or spacetimes, won’t give a metric 
structure simply encoded in coordinate numbering alone: you also need explicit 
reference to the metric tensor in the chosen coordinates. It is easy - at least in 
thought - to separate purely coordinate complexities from those that spring from 
variable curvatures in spacetime structure in GR proper. Einstein omits that 
distinction in Part A. 
Even in the simple departure of skew coordinates, it is obvious that coordinate 
numbers and differences seldom directly tell us the distance between points in space 
itself. The metric tensor is needed too. Substitute the appropriate coordinate-
derived numbers in the metric tensor equation, solve it, and the result is exactly what 
one got ‘directly’ through Cartesian (Lorentzian) coordinates. In those coordinates 
the tensor is simplified by its coefficients being either 0 or 1. While the calculation in 
skew (or in more general) coordinates is more articulated and more complex the 
information delivered is always the same. 
In randomly curved general coordinates, even in flat spacetimes, the geometry 
within spacelike hypersurfaces picked out by t-constant points may curve and vary 
wildly. Their geometry will not be Euclidean. Further, since numbering on any 
spacelike coordinate curve need encode only topological information, coordinate 
differences say nothing about lengths along the curve between points on it. Similarly 
on x,y,z-constant timelike coordinate curves, the magnitude of coordinate number 
differences between points on the curve makes no attempt to match information 
about the magnitude of the proper-time intervals on a clock whose trajectory tracks 
the coordinate curve between the points. They do not convey the wrong measures of 
things in space. They convey no measures. The natural ordering relations between 
the number quadruples that identify the points in the general system have to mimic 
only the smooth, continuous spatial (spatiotemporal) ordering of the relations of 
separation and connection among points in the space (spacetime) itself. So number 
mismatches between coordinate intervals and spatial (spatiotemporal) metric 
intervals are inevitable. Arbitrarily singling out some wobbly spacelike hypersurface 
changes nothing physical in spacetime. No new definitions of space and time are 
needed and no new theory, unless a theory of coordinates. 
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As for rods and clocks, whether or not spacetime is curved, good clocks (by 
definition of ‘good’) measure proper-time intervals and good rods measure spatial 
ones. New coordinate styles don’t change that. Variations in the coordinate times 
between ticks of a clock tell us nothing about whether the clock runs fast or slow. 
Until we enter the territory of curvature or gravitation none of this goes beyond 
Minkowski spacetime or undermines the privilege of inertial frames. That new 
territory does need a new understanding of spatiotemporal concepts. When there 
are neither parallels nor a Pythagorean orthogonality structure11 no coordinates can 
be direct in Einstein’s sense or simplest in the sense described above i.e. when the 
cross terms in the metric tensor vanish. A generally coordinate formulation is 
usually inescapable in GR. This is clear in the later Parts of (1916) but appears 
nowhere in Part A except, indirectly, in §4. 
 
Another 2-postulate misdirection 
 
The 2-postulate version, together with the fatal attraction of the epistemological 
theory of the relativity of motion, led Einstein to address specific examples, rather 
than the simple, general feature just mentioned - that matter curves spacetime. 
Examples dominate, since he wants always to pick out some new stationary system. 
Consider Einstein’s Part A §3 example (115-6) of a disk rotating relative to an 
inertial system F1 with its centre at rest in F1. There are clocks fixed to the disk’s 
circumference and rotating with it relative to F1. There is also a clock at its centre at 
rest relative both to the disk and to F1. There are also standard measuring rods 
attached to the disk and used to survey it. Relative to F1, the circumference clocks 
“run slow” but the central one does not. The rods on the disk will be “contracted” 
in length by their circular motion when measuring the circumference of the disk, 
but not when used to measure its radius.  
If the disk is now taken as the rest frame i.e. as not rotating, then clocks fixed to 
its circumference will “run slow” despite being at rest. So the rate of a clock seems 
to depend on where it is. Rods along the circumference will be “contracted” 
compared with those lying along the radius. So, in this (non-inertial) frame the ratio 
of radius to circumference of the disk will not be π. The geometry on the 
                                                
11 Except in very small regions. 
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“stationary” disk will not be Euclidean. A gravitational field must be imposed within 
the frame of reference despite the absence of spacetime curvature. 
That is misleading. 
General covariance permits coordinates that describe the disk as stationary but 
they are neither neat nor necessary since F1 describes the same world more simply. 
The 2-postulate version’s fixation on rest states, material clocks, rods and light 
signals easily leads to confusion of coordinate space and time with proper length 
and time, to a groundless suspicion that time and space are being redefined, that 
clocks run at different rates at different places that the speed of light is somehow 
inconstant and so on. It tells us nothing about GR. 
 
Final remarks 
 
Einstein writes: “…in the general theory of relativity space and time cannot be 
defined in such a way that differences in the spatial coordinates can be directly 
measured by the unit measuring rod, or differences in the time coordinates by a 
standard clock.” (117) True, but not simply because of new choices of coordinates. 
In the presence of masses, the matter tensor cannot be Euclidean since spacetime 
curves and may curve variably. Then you can’t use Cartesian or Lorentz 
coordinates. That is why “The general laws of nature are to be expressed by equations which 
hold good for all systems of coordinates, that is, are covariant with respect to any substitutions 
whatever (generally covariant)”. (117 Einstein’s italics). That, too, is true but no Part A 
argument entails or explains it. Last, Einstein draws his main metaphysical 
conclusion: “…this requirement of general covariance…takes away from space and 
time the last remnant of physical objectivity” (loc. cit.). It does not follow. 
Presumably he intended this as an intuitive thesis that joins hands with what’s 
known as the Point Coincidence Argument: “…the results of our measurings are 
nothing but verifications of such meetings as the material points of our measuring 
instruments with other material points…and observed point-events happening at 
the same place and at the same time.” (loc. cit.) 
General covariance takes nothing away from the reality of space and time. It is 
merely about changes in coordinates. In Part A it seems clear that Einstein confused 
the arbitrariness of coordinate choice with a lack of structure in spacetime itself. 
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Minkowski’s version of SR, where the fundamental entity is spacetime, readily 
accommodates the path-breaking concepts forged in later Parts – spacetime’s 
curvature in the presence of mass, the reduction of tidal gravitation force to 
curvature, the need for general coordinates.  
That Einstein’s bold ontological claim was right nevertheless has found 
distinguished support (Norton (2011), Earman and Norton (1987)). It rests mainly 
on the contentious hole argument. This is not the place to pursue that theme in 
detail. For an extensive critique of it along these lines see Nerlich (2013 ch. 10). 
Briefly, the hole argument fails because the ideas underlying Leibniz 
Equivalence as a metaphysical thesis are indefensible. In spaces that are non-
Euclidean, the kinematic and dynamic shifts are never symmetries: there are no 
parallel trajectories for them to exploit. The Principle of the Identity of 
Indiscernibles, metaphysical, certainly, but always dubious, can’t then convert 
symmetries into identities because the differences resulting from the shifts reveal 
that space does have a real observable structure. They also reveal something of 
what it is. It is clear, further, that which spatial relations can be postulated in some 
region of space or spacetime is not independent of the geometry of the region. It is 
no longer assumed as a philosophical thesis that space is Euclidean so the price of 
substantivalism does not break the metaphysical bank despite the suggestions of the 
hole argument (Nerlich (1991 and 2013), ch. 1). 
Leibniz Equivalence does no better when one turns to the differentiable manifold 
but I shall not pursue the matter further than to say that active diffeomorphisms of 
the manifold do not have point coincidences as direct invariants. The commanding 
requirement on diffeomorphisms is that they preserve relations of separation and 
connection among manifold points; i.e. the topology is invariant and the 
transformations reveal it as a real spatiotemporal structure. Point coincidences and 
tensors in general are indeed “dragged along’ in diffeomorphisms but the 
transformations are not directly aimed at that. 
Leibniz Equivalence  can be invoked as good pragmatic advice: ignore 
differences that your theory itself tells you are inconsequential. 
The Point Coincidence thesis is false. If we are to have any coherent and 
synoptic physics at all then we must necessarily observe that some point-
coincidences occur elsewhere or elsewhen from others, being smoothly separated 
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and connected by spacetime intervals. In an aphorism “Time is nature’s way of 
keeping everything from happening at once; space is what prevents everything from 
happening to me.”12 These are observable truths.  
Kretschmann (1917) pointed out that using generally covariant coordinates does 
not affect the geometric content of a theory. Einstein acknowledged the error but 
seems never to have revised the 2-postulate approach to GR or fully embraced the 
reduction of gravity to geometry; i.e. identifying spacetime geodesics as free-fall 
trajectories and thus necessarily purely kinematic. Geodesics have zero acceleration 
vectors at every point and therefore no force vectors at any point. In the Leyden 
lecture  (Einstein (1983)) and the Princeton lectures (Einstein (1953)) gravity is 
treated as an action - as a dynamical, not a kinematical, motion. (See Petkov (2012). 
Spacetime is tentatively regarded as an ether in order to escape action at a distance. 
The spacetime metric field is seen as coincident with, but not identical to, the 
gravitational field. In the later editions of his popular exposition (Einstein (1954)), 
GR is introduced just as it was in 1916 Part A. 
In Part A, Einstein’s dogmatic empiricism blinded him to structures in later Parts 
that lay in plain sight and were the shining jewels of his unsurpassed inventive 
genius. The unfortunate influence of this, especially on positivism in succeeding 
decades, is a topic for another paper. Minkowski’s tragically early death (1864-
1909) robbed us of a constructive, imaginative and rather different perspective on 
GR. 
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